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Abstract 
 
 This paper evaluates the post modernist critique of Enlightenment rationality. It 
argues that the universal claims of Enlightenment epistemology have been effectively 
deconstructed. However, a universal rationality is possible and Imam Ibn Khaldun’s work 
on history provides a basis for explications of universal rationality. 
 
 
 
Research 
 
 The basic purpose of this paper is an epistemological one. The question which 
will be discussed in this paper is whether we are epistemologically capable of 
transcending our historical particularity and cultural specificity. If the answer is yes, then 
what is the epistemological instrument we have, which makes this transcendence 
possible. If the answer is no, this means that “truth” and “goodness” both are historically 
specific and culturally determined and we all are  the subjects of historical processes. The 
second position creates an epistemological dilemma; if truth and goodness are derived 
from history then what will be the criterion to assess, judge and analyze the direction of 
this historical process itself. We believe that it is an epistemological necessity to have a 
meta-historical reference point which must have the potential to provide a criterion of 
truth and goodness and ideals and virtues etc. which are emerging from the historical 
unfolding of human civilization as a whole. 
 
 This paper has been divided into two sections. In the first section we will discuss 
the significance of history in the determination of truth and goodness, particularly in the 
context of the post-modern critique of modernity and it’s a-historical claim of 
universality. In the second section we will discuss the possibility of the existence of a 
meta-historical reference point in Imam Ibn-I-Khaldun’s system of thought. In the 
concluding section we will try to establish that there is an epistemological necessity for 
articulating a meta-historical reference to judge and assess the conception of the good 
which has emerged from Modernity. This means that such a meta-historical reference 
provides the epistemological content for the assessment of the historical process itself. 
 
History, Truth and the Good: The post modern antique of modernity 
 
 The phenomenon of globalization has not only brought different cultures together 
but it has also revitalized the issue of identity. People become aware about similarities 
and differences between cultures and individuals. Multi-culturalism is claimed to be a 
realistic framework to reconcile the differences among cultural particularities. This 
contemporary discourse of multi-culturalism and diversity of comprehensive doctrines 
has emerged from the epistemological crisis faced by the modernists due to the “collapse 
of the enlightenment, project on a world historical scale” (Gray 1991 p 176). 
Enlightenment thought in general and Modernist thought in particular considers 
“rationality” as a fundamental criterion for determining the “truth-value”: or objectivity 
of a moral theory and a political stance. The Modernists believe  that the essence of man 
lies in his “rationality”. Thus rationality was considered to be a fundamental basis of 
agreement among persons and justified the cross cultural application of rationally derived 
“truths”. Such truth is claimed ot be absolute, certain, universal nad most-importantly a 
historical. The intellectual outcome of this Modernist assumption is that it is believed that 
the, “theory guarantees that a moral belief that cannot be justified to the mass of mankind 
is irrational” (Gray 1991 p2). The absolutist or universalist posture of modern thought 
rested upon the assumption of universally valid reason and the epistemological possibility 
of its cross cultural application. This epistemologically gounded stance of universalism 
undermines the significance of cultural particularity, historical specificity and the role of 
traditions in the constitution of the good. This the historical bent of Modernism has 
developed an organic relation between self-perfection and public policy through the 
instrument of universally valid reason. Modernist relance on universally valied reason 
compels this ideology to provide a framework in which, “human beings will shed their 
traditional allegiances and their local identitites and unite in a universal civilization 
grounded in generic humanity and a rational morality” (Klinger 2004 p 122). 
 
 The Modernist discovers the essence of humans in their rationality. This 
anthropocentric essentialism has questioned the epistemological legitimacy of traditional-
religions authority. Modernity claims to posses an epistemological criterion which has the 
potential to emancipate the human subject from traditional and religious frameworks to 
determine the meaning of life and the telos of existence. The detachment of the modern 
subject from traditional religious epistemology and the emergen ce of secularization are 
the unintended consequences of this alternative epistemology. Under concepts of 
“nature” and “culture” the yoke of modern rationalization “the subject is forced to take up 
the god-like position of a transcendental nodal point in order to ensure the unity and 
totality of being and experience” (Klinger 2004 p 122). According to Klinger concepts 
like “origin” and “traditions” were substituted by because of the former religious and 
mythological connotation. The idea of origin presumes the act of creation which “refers 
to a transcendental anchorage mediated to the present through the chain of traditions” 
(Lorner 1954 p 94). This replacement has specific epistemological and ontological 
underpinnings. 
 
 The continental rationalists believe in the unlimited potential of human rational 
faculty. They try to resolve metaphysical questions through the epistemological 
instrument of universally valid reason. Kant was the first Enlightenment thinker who 
acknowledges the limits of human  reason. Kant has not only successfully reconciled the 
epistemological antagonism between rationalism (as postulated by Descartes and 
Spinoza) and empiricism (of Locke, Berkely and Hume) he also acknowledges the limits 
of human reason. He identifies the epistemological incapacity of universally valid reason 
to understand the noumena (i.e. the realm of reality which is not empirically accessible). 
“Kant calls things in themselves as “Noumena”, because they are the entities of the 
understanding to which no object of experience can ever correspond and contrasts them 
with phenomena” (Korner 1956 p 66). Kant believes that the categories of reason are 
only applicable to phenomena i.e. to the empirical. The application of pure rational 
categories to the objects which are not subject to perceptions can not provide any 
knowledge. In this epistemological framework “any attempt of metaphysicians to achieve 
knowledge in this manner is doomed to failure” (Korner 1956 p 66). Since metaphysical 
objects are noumenal therefore Kant believes that knowledge of “metaphysical of this 
sort is at most a universal disposition to theoretical hallucinations which must be 
diagnosed and cured” (Korner 1956 p168). But this does not mean that  he undermines 
the capacity of human reason. 
 
 Man according to Kant has been equipped with reason therefore he must not be 
influenced by instincts; rather “he must produce everything out of himself” (Kant 1993 p 
24). He believes that “Reason in a creature is a faculty of which it is characteristic to 
extend the laws and purposes involved in the use of all its powers far beyond the sphere 
of natural instincts” (Kant 1933 p 24). Despite the fact that Kant acknowledge the limits 
of Rationality, and does not abandon the possibility of universally valid reason and its 
legitimate applicability in the domain of phenomena, which provides the epistemological 
ground for universalist claims, particularly, his idea of the categorical imperative 
provides an absolute, certain and universal basis for moral imperatives. He has a 
universalistic conception of history which rests upon the epistemological ground of 
reason. He believes that, “the history of (the) human race, viewed as a whole may be 
regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about political constitution 
internally and for this purpose, also externally perfect, as the only state in which all the 
capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed” (Kant 1933 p 39). The 
process of history is judged by its compatibility to the rational laws. Kant believes that it 
will be mistaken  to assume that “nature even in the play of human freedom does not 
proceed without plan and design” (Kant 1933 p12). We may imply that it is a 
philosophical attempt to workout the universal history of the human race which is 
compatible with the plan of nature. Kant thinks  “the universal history of the world 
according to the plan of nature in its aiming at a perfect civil union must be regarded as 
possible and as even capable of helping forward the purpose of nature” (Kant 1933 p 32). 
However, he acknowledges that , “the idea of universal history is no doubt to a certain 
extent of an a-prior character” (i.e. Rational) (Kant 1933 p 32). (emphasis added). 
 
 The major thrust of the philosophy of history within the Enlightenment tradition 
is rationalistic. Enlightenment thinkers were influenced by the discoveries in the realm of 
physical 
sciences. It is because of this that they generally believe that in order to resolve social 
problems we have to use scientific methodology. For instance the Hegelian approach 
towards the understanding of history rested upon the assumption that, “the underlying 
structure of the world could be understood by grasping the content of certain fundamental 
concepts or categories, these being related to one another in such a manner as to form a 
self-determining series or progression” (Gardner 1933 p 59). 
 
 There is no doubt that Hegel tries to establish a metaphysical framework for the 
understanding of history as a whole, despite the fact that Kant abandons the possibility of 
the epistemological grounding of metaphysics. Hegel claims to have discovered the law 
of history through the process of dialectical reasoning. It is important to note that since 
the phenomenal world is epistemologically accessible within the Kantian framework 
human history is the concretization or the expression of the absolute in the Hegelian 
context. Hence by postulating the imminence of the absolute or spirit. Hegel reduces the 
contradiction between transcendence and imminence and everything become 
phenomenal. This means that the phenomenal world is the expression of ideal 
relationships, and these are interpretable through the framework of logic. Therefore 
Hegel believes that, “nature and spirit, nature and mind must be treated as confirming to 
similarly dialectical laws” (Gardner 1933 p 59). 
 
 Despite this, Hegelian dialectical law is the product of a specific historical age, 
but interestingly he considers himself as the last philosopher because he thinks that some 
how he has discovered the internal law of human history as a whole and the 
epistemological instrument which makes this wonder possible is “logic”. In this sense, 
this law is itself a historical. Hegel considers his method as “a science of pure thought” 
(Catlin 1939 p 490). This reflects the modern spirit of his thought. His idea of history 
because of its meta-historical temperament provides the theoretical ground of not only the 
understanding of history but of understanding all domains of human intellectual 
endeavors. For instance this methodology is claimed to be workable “to develop an 
unprecedented political philosophy … like geometry in its coherence in which human 
philosophical thought would reach systematic expression” (Catlin 1939 p 490). 
 
 Marx has eliminated the idealistic content of the Hegelian dialectical method. The 
Marxist idea of history rests upon the assumption that dialectical methodology is 
essentially scientific. It is because of this positivistic approach, that secularization and 
material progress are theoretical corollaries of scientific socialism as expounded by Marx. 
It is an acknowledged fact that through the framework of historical materialism. Marx in 
effect redrew the map of history. Marx was influenced by Holback’s idea of generalities 
which enabled him to conceptualize historical materialism as “a doctrine applicable like a 
science, to all phases of social and political life” (Catlin 1939 p 460). The Marxist 
scientific explanation of the historical process presumes a “law” (which despite the fact 
that it has been discovered by an individual, i.e. Marx, who himself was the product of 
his own historical material conditions) is actually a-historical and provides, such an 
objective framework for historical understanding that it will be “difficult for historians 
even to look at their subject in quite the same fashion as they had done before” (Gardner 
1933 p 14). Since historical process is governed by a-historical law which is itself meta-
historical, thus in this context the historical person is for Marx only the exponent of 
historical forces (i.e. material forces). This implies that the agent of history that is 
individual “does notmake history, he executes it”. This is also true for Hegel. This a-
historical and universalistic potential  
of Marxist historical materialism is a manifestation of Modernist epistemology.  
 
 And his epistemological reliance on scientific methodology unveils its organic 
relation 
with the epistemological legacy of Modernity. It is reasonable to claim that both 
extremely powerful ideas of history expanded by Hegel and Marx (irrespective of how 
scientific, logical and rational they were) are actually teleological. The telos for Hegel is 
rational progress, and for Marx it is material progress. This reveals a theoretical nexus 
between a-historical frameworks and “telos”, on the basis of this we may hold that any a-
historical framework must necessarily be teleological. 
 
 This theoretical amalgamation of a-historicity and teleology revitalizes the 
traditional philosophical problem regarding the priority of ontology over epistemology. 
The real issue is whether the “telos” determines the a-historical principle which explains 
the historical movement itself. Or the a-historical principle itself determines the telos of 
historical movement. This problem must to be resolved for an epistemologically viable 
historical analysis. And one can imagine the gravity of the epistemological situation 
because both “telos” and the “a-historical principle” are derived by the individual who is 
ontologically situated in a particular historical context, a subject of the historical process 
himself. 
 
 The purpose of Enlightenment thought was the realization of freedom and the 
instrument which made that universal freedom realizable was presumed to be reason. 
This quest for freedom has questioned the epistemological priority of traditional forms of 
authorities (i.e. God, Church, revelation, tradition etc) “Kant … describes the 
Enlightenment as the movement when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, 
without subjugating itself to any authority” (Foucault 1976 p 18). The epistemological 
reliance of Enlightenment thinkers in general over transcendental conception of reason 
rests upon the assumption that the essence of the human lies in its rationality. This 
fundamentalist approach has not only rationalized the whole socio-cultural fabric of the 
Western world but has also established the institutional framework for the realization of 
freedom and progress (the transformation of the world into heaven through the 
application of universally valid reason). Their faith in human rationality enables the 
Modernists to replace God by rational man, “all that Christian theology says is absolutely 
true, provided it is applied not to a transcendental and imaginary God, but to Man himself 
(Descomber 1988 p 29). 
 
 The twentieth century experience has shattered the epistemological authority of 
reason and has also questioned the universalizable capacity of reason. Post modern 
thought, “rejects the transcendental conception of reason, and puts forth conceptions of 
reason, which are ungrounded and lack ultimate justification” (Lyotard 1985 p XXIV). 
 
 The post-modernists do not abandon the possibility of being rational. They 
consider reason to be “a thing of this world” and reject its transcendental capacity. This 
post modernist conception of reason not only undermines the Enlightenment project and 
its institutions but most importantly also the epistemological basis of modern thought. 
The philosophical rejection of the possibility of transcendental reason, transforms the 
epistemological discourse of Modernity and the justification of the institutions. Megill 
acknowledges that, “yet for all its importance in defining our problems and justifying our 
institutions, my guess is that, the primacy of the Enlightenment, its importance in setting 
the terms of our discourse will not continue much longer” (Megill 1984 p 340). 
 
 Post modernists, claim that the modernist conception of the epistemological 
priority of universally valid reason undermines the possibility of human freedom. They 
believe that freedom is not achieved through transcendental rationality because the 
rational identifies the realm of necessity. They argue that modernity is the continuation of 
the traditional form of authoritarianism. It replaces revelational authority by the authority 
of transcendental reason. This ontologically grounded epistemological priority of 
transcendental reason according  to the Post-modernists is the legacy of the Christian 
ideas of authority. This conception of reason provides the epistemological framework of 
transcendental subjectivity, universality, necessity and essentialism. 
 
 The Post-modernists reject the modernist thirst for grounding, foundation and 
essence by the abandonment of transcendental reason which provides a-historical 
criterion for all  kinds of evaluations. The Post-modernist conception of reason is 
ungrounded, and lacks ultimate justification. Reason is seen as culturally specific and 
historically determined and it reveals the ontological ungroundedness of human being. 
Reason acknowledges the epistemological incapacity of the human to discover an 
abstract realm of absolute, certain and universal knowledge. The rejection of 
transcendental reason opens up a new realm of epistemological discourse, Bernstein 
acknowledges that, “a new conversation is now emerging among philosophers – a 
conversation about human rationality and as a result of this dialogue we are beginning to 
gain a new understanding of rationality that has important ramifications for both 
theoretical and practical life” (Beusteen 2001 p 74). Gadamer believers that the modernist 
quest for a neutral epistemological paradigm is unrealizable. For a meaningful 
epistemological pursuit, “what is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept 
of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices if we, want 
to do justice  to man’s finite, historical mode of being (Gadamer 1985 p 261). Gadamer 
thinks that the Enlightenment thinkers have their own prejudices but the problem is that 
they consider that the use of their own reason (i.e. transcendental reason) enables them to 
transcend the traditional bonds of authorities and prejudices. He claims that, “the 
distinction that Enlightenment draws between faith in authority and the use of one’s own 
reason is, in itself legitimate. If the prestige of authority takes the place of one’s own 
judgment, then the authority is infact a source of prejudice. But this does not include the 
possibility that it can also be a source of truth and this is what Enlightenment failed to see 
when it denigrated all authority” (Gadamer 1985 p 263). 
 
 MacIntyre believes that the human telos is “vital to morality, understood as a 
rationally justifiable or objective enterprise, because it alone can license immediate 
transitions from “is” to “ought” (Mulhall 1991 p731). This means that without identifying 
a “telos”, existing character traits cannot be identifies as good / bad. In a nutshell without 
“telos” there can be no ground for morality. MacIntyre presumes an Aristotelian 
framework for the objective moral evaluation of human conduct. In such a framework 
telos is considered as a theoretical instrument which provides the basis for judging 
existing character and is grounded in the culture and history of a civilization. 
  
 
 
 MacIntyre believes that internal substantive values are evolved by consociational 
human endeavors. These internal goods cannot be realized or achieved without engaging 
in practice. By practice he means “any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence and human conception of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended” (MacIntyre 1981 p 175). This means that virtue by definition is 
communally determined. It can objectively be acquired by participation in practices and 
acquirement of internal goods which are specific to these practices. But participation in a 
practice requires that I subjugate my preferences / attitudes to the communal standards 
and authorities that currently defines a practice. These standards of the practices define 
the limits of criticism. The practice can only be criticized on the basis of the criterion that 
the practice itself recognizes. Moreover practices can only be criticized by the 
participants. Thus the judgment about the practices cannot be regarded as purely 
subjective or arbitrary, in other words moral judgments are not of emotive nature. 
 
 Participation is intrinsically a shared project based on communally and 
historically determined standards. It creates a valuable form of life which has objective 
grounds to  differentiate between meaningful and meaningless forms of life. There can be 
many practices with different internal goods and evaluations within them. These practices 
can be based on norms / procedures inherent in them. But there is no basis for objectively 
evaluating one practice against another. Thus objective moral evaluation is possible and it 
can only be possible within a culturally specific paradigm. Therefore MacIntyre rejects 
any claim on the basis of universally valid reason. MacIntyre believes that “participation 
in such shared projects, acceptance of such communally and historically determined 
standards initiate the individual into forms of life in which human judgments of worth are 
immune to the threat of emotivism (Mulhall 1891 p 137). This means that he meaning of 
any event can be grasped by relating it to the history of the performer’s life and 
contextuality of the act which is being performed. In a nutshell “being / life is lived 
historically”. Life is lived both in response to (unpredictable / arbitrary) developments 
and teleological struggle to achieve some purposed. It implies that the particular history 
of the individual determines the purpose of his life. For instance when I am confronted 
with the question, shall I be a chess player or a father? I can only prefer one practice over 
another on the basis of what is more consistent with the history of my life (in a particular 
cultural context). Since in the Modernist specially Kuntian framework the person is 
standing outside history therefore on the one hand there can be no such thing as moral 
personal development and on the other hand he is incapable (ontologically) of pursuing 
an objectively determined purpose. 
 
 The incompatibility between the priority of right (over the good) and the 
possibility of moral growth is explored by liberal communitarians. Communitarians in 
general and Taylor and MacIntyre in particular believe that conceptions of the good have 
been derived by the evaluation of moral intuitions namely “strong evaluations”. By 
strong evaluation Taylor means “discriminations of right and wrong in terms of standards 
that are independent of our desires and preferences and 
that allow us to evaluate their worth (Mulhall 1991 p 131). The strong evaluation is in 
one sense rational and on the other hand aesthetical, rational in the sense that the 
evaluation of the moral intuitions takes place within a social matrix of a particular 
linguistic community with a specific concept of the “rational”. It is possible to rationally 
order and determine the worth of different competing conceptions of the good on the 
basis of its coherence with the meta-ethical narrative. These supra-rational, meta-ethical 
narratives provide the substance of rational ordering in a specific community; they have 
emerged from the history of a particular community. Therefore there is no possibility of 
rational ordering of the conceptions of good among two different communities. In this 
context that objectively rational ordering of the conceptions of the good is possible within 
an intra-communal paradigm and aesthetical in the context of the extra-communal sphere. 
In a nutshell the preferences of one language community cannot be rationally evaluated 
by that of an other community. This incommensurability is due to the experiential 
differences of the historical experience of one community to that of an other. Thus moral 
growth is possible within a particular civilization. It is possible only to differentiate 
between people on the basis of the reflection in their moral life of the “ontological truths” 
which are considered to be valid in that civilization alone. 
 
 Taylor pointed out that every individual has many conceptions of the good in his 
life, and sometimes these conceptions are in conflict with each other. So there is a need of 
a traditional reordering of these conceptions of the good. This hierarchical categorization 
of different conceptions is possible on the basis of a good which is relatively superior to 
others. Qualitatively higher-order goods are called “hyper-goods”. This reordering of 
goods is not a subjective phenomena, it has an objective basis, which is ontologically 
backed and historically grounded. The communitarian rejection of moral subjectivism in 
general and the notion of the unencumbered self in particular is based on their 
presumption that without having an ontologically grounded conception of the good it is 
not possible to derive abstract principles of justice. Taylor believes that the individual’s 
self identity, his conceptions of the good and his historical specificity are all ontologically 
linked with each other. He claims that the hyper goods “usually arise through a historical 
suppression of earlier (conceptions of the good. Mulhall 1991 p 119). This means that the 
hyper-goods endorse the justification of hierarchy among different conceptions of the 
good. This reordering of the good is not the manifestation of emotivist or subjective 
inference of personal preferences / desires. This transvaluation is based on practical 
reason. Taylor believes that “practice; reasoning … is a reasoning in transition. It aims to 
establish, not that some position is correct absolutely but rather that some position is 
superior to some other (Taylor 1990 p 92). The contestability of interpretations on the 
basis of meta-ethical narratives makes it possible to realize a way of life in which “we 
have lived a transition which we understand as error-reducing and hence as epistemic 
gain (Taylor 1990 p 71). This makes objective transvaluation possible by practical 
reasoning. Thus we find a reconciliation of relativism and objectivism in  a moral 
context, relativistic in the sense that there is a legitimate transformation among different 
conceptions of the good and objective in the sense that the contestability among different 
conceptions of the good is based on practical reasoning specific to a history / culture. 
This conciliation essentially negates moral subjectivism and universalism. The rejection 
of universalism culminates in the transition to practical reasoning. The natural corollary 
of this transition is that the derivation of a-historical abstract principles of justice is not 
possible. This rejection is the rejection of the Archimedean position and Rawlsian 
original position, the paradigm which makes the operation of external reason possible. It 
implies that the contestability of interpretations among different conceptions of the good 
is only meaningful within a historically specific linguistic community. This means that 
transvaluation of hyper-goods is possible due to the participation of within a linguistic 
matrix of a community which is prior to the individual. The conception of hyper-good 
negates the neutrality of the good because” (it) presents us with a good which challenges 
and displaces others” (Taylor 1950 p 721). This is one of the reasons that hyper-goods are 
considered as a source of conflict “they presuppose an ultimate intolerance of the other 
goods to which they assign lower rank” (Mulhall 1991 p 115). This intolerance has an 
epistemological basis which justifies “moral growth”. “A hyper-good involves our 
changing, a change which is qualified as ‘growth’, or ‘satisfaction’ or ‘higher 
consciousness’ and even involves one repudiating earlier goods” (Taylor 1990 p 70). 
Thus we find a rejection of emotivism and justification, of objective relativism because 
the repudiation of one good in favor of the other has historically specific and 
ontologically grounded objective justification. Since the hyper-goods “have usually 
arisen through a historical suppression of earlier, less adequate views; they present 
themselves as steps to a higher moral consciousness (Mulhall 1991 p 115). Thus the 
conception of the hyper-good legitimizes “moral growth”.  
 
 From the above discussion we can imply that the epistemological priority of 
universally valid reason is not only questioned by Post modernists but this idea has also 
been replaced by culture specific and historically determined reason in post modernist 
discussion. If this is true, then in contemporary discourses it is very difficult if not 
impossible to find on epistemological source which can provide a meta-historical 
criterion to judge the movement of the historical process itself. 
 
II  Meta History and Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun 
 
 Khaldunian socio-political analysis is relevant to addressing the epistemological 
problem with which we are dealing . It can provide an epistemological basis for 
generating a-historical principles for the assessment of historical processes. Despite the 
fact that Khaldunian socio-political theory is based on cultural specific and ethno-centric 
reality i.e. “Asabiya” there is in it an embodied truth which is not the product of history 
but is essentially a-historical. Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun claims this is an epistemologically 
validated a-historical criterion which provides a normative standard for the evaluation of 
the historical process and the institutions which emerge from this process. 
 
 Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun believes that the state has a life of its own. He considers the 
state to be an organism which functions according to the law of causality. The Imam 
argues that the development of the state is a natural phenomenon governed by the 
principle of causality and necessity for the socio-cultural and political survival of a 
civilization. The analysis of state structure, constitution, evolution and deterioration is 
essential for understanding human civilization as a whole Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s 
approach is views history as an organic whole. It is because of this that the Imam’s 
thought is epistemologically relevant in the analysis of all aspects of social life and 
behavior. The Imam tries to eliminate the apparent antagonism among economic, social, 
political and theological domains, collapsing them within a single unifying metaphysical 
framework. 
 
 
 
 We cannot detach Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s presumed “sociology” from his 
philosophy of history. In Muqaddima he tries to elucidate the history of cultures 
(Basharat 1967 p 39). Oreintalists regard Ibn-e-Khaldun to be an original thinker, a 
genuine “sociologist” and a critical-historian who considers history to be an 
indispensable tool for the understanding and analysis of socio-cultural transformation and 
for understanding how axiological conflicts emerge within social systems. But they glass 
over and ignore the fact that Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s methodology does not transcend the 
epistemological foundations of the basic Islamic sources of knowledge (i.e. Quran and 
Sunnah). 
 
 Human civilization is the object of inquiry for Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s historic 
investigations. Theory and “sociology” are basically intellectual corollaries of his new 
science of history. His methodology is fundamentally empiricist, but his empirical 
analysis is not detached from his religious particularity and his commitment to Islamic 
epistemology. It is obvious that his work “is deeply rooted in the traditional beliefs and 
convictions of Islam” (Rosenthal 1988 p 84). 
 
 His epistemological reliance on Quran and Sunnah enables him to reconcile 
empiricism and tradition. The “naturalist scientific and empiricist” dimensions of the 
Imam’s thought have unfortunately been over emphasized by Western professionals as a 
result of which have sought to discover a non existent secular aspect of the Imam’s socio-
political theory and cultural anthropology. On the other hand the essential role of the 
Quran and the Sunnah which provides the epistemological criterion for an objective 
analysis of socio-political structures has been totally ignored. The conception Asabiya (its 
constitution, its role in the establishment and disintegration of a dynasty), the Imam’s 
political theory, his conceptions of history etc.) are sought to be understood by 
abstracting them from the epistemological framework of the Quran and the Sunnah. 
Rosenthal acknowledges that “Ibn-e-Khaldun’s empiricism manifest in his “new science” 
is matched by his traditionalism. His traditionalism is epistemologically grounded in Fiqh 
and tafsir (Rosenthal 1988 p 84). 
 
 According to the Imam the state is the natural culmination of the power struggle 
between different collectivities. He argues that the state is necessary for the socio-
political survival of any civilization and the constitution of “Asabiya” is inevitable for the 
emergence of the state, i.e. it provides an essential foundation of the state. Religion 
provides a criterion to judge every socio-political transformation and also the direction of 
that transformation. The Imam acknowledges that although the weakening of religious 
commitment enhanced the strength and domination of the Khilafa but this deviation, 
“inevitably lead to its transformation into absolute monarchy in the form of the mulk 
(Rosenthal 1988 p 96). He thinks that the strength of Asabiya and that of religion 
complement each other, Asabiya provides an initial and very strong basis for the bending 
of like minded people which presumes ties of kinship and blood. The unification of like 
minded people for socio-political domination will be actualized in the form of the state. 
But the dynasty which emerges requires political association “ijtima” and can not survive 
without it (on the basis of his genealogical analysis the Imam claims that, it falls within 
three generations). 
 
 “The term of life of a dynasty does not normally exceed three generations (of 40 
years each). For in the first generation are still preserved the characteristic features of 
rough, uncivilized rural life (badawa), such as hard conditions of life, ferocity and 
partnership on authority (majd.). Therefore the strength of the ‘Asabiya is maintained … 
and men submit to their domination. In the second generation their condition has 
changed, under the influence of the rule (mulk) … from rural to city-life, from a hard 
struggle to ease and abundance, from partnership in authority to autocracy …. Wherefore 
the strength of the ‘Asabiya is partly broken … The third generation has forgotten the 
time of badawa … as if it had never existed – unlike the second generation which lives on 
the memory of the first – and loses the sweetness of force and ‘Asabiya because they are 
in possession of power. Ease reaches its peak under them because they become used to a 
pleasant and abundant life … the ‘Asabiya collapses completely, and they forget about 
defence, attack and pursuit (of the enemy)” (Rosenthal 1988 p 88). 
 
 There are different factors which the Imam thinks explain the disintegration of 
political order. Two of the most important are 
1. the antagonistic relation between rural and urban life style. 
2. the internal rivalry and discord leading to the disintegration of Asabiya. 
 
 It is important to note that both causes are the unintended consequences of the 
culmination within the State, of the internal contradiction between the “badawa” (a life of 
simplicity, and courage) and “hadara” (a life of ease, luxury and pleasure). This conflict 
undermines the strength of the state and its capacity to sustain order within the dynasty 
and to defend or protect it against external threats. On the other hand internal rivalries 
weaken natural ties and undermine Asabiya’s capacity for state self-preservation and 
domination. 
 
 The Imam believes that “religion by prophecy or by a call (da’wa) to its truth, is 
the (only) source from which great empires spring (Rosenthal 1988 p 96). State or 
political order without “telos” (which can transcend the naturally constituted desires or 
objectives of “hadara” looses its capacity to sustain and survive. The internal cohesion of 
Asabiya is also not necessarily invincible, and the Imam thus stresses the necessary limits 
of ethno-centric collectivity. 
 
 Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s political theory is influenced by his historical analysis of 
the socio-political history of Berber tribes (Almorvides and Almohad). Their 
transformation from rural to urban life and the stages of socio-political “development 
sketched by him in the Muqaddima and Kitab-al-Libas, which no doubt is a purely 
empirical naturalistic approach for the understanding of socio-political order. Khaldun 
himself was the product of his own period. But his epistemological commitment is 
reflected in his reconciliation of empiricist naturalism with Islamic traditionalism, 
“Khuldun acknowledges again and again that the dominion is as necessary as the will to 
power and domination as natural Power cannot be gained and without the call of religion” 
(Rosenthal 1988 p 96). But if the emergence of state domination is natural, its decline is 
also natural because of  the disintegration of Asabiya due to rivalry, discord and 
antagonism between urban and rural life. The Imam acknowledges that it is religion alone 
which “unites the hearts, replaces the desire for the vanity of the world and turns men to 
God seeking right and truth in union” (Rosenthal 1988 p 96). 
 
 Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun argues that socio-political order can be established through 
taghallub (subjugation) and Qahr (force) but such domination is only temporal and leads 
to disaster. He thinks that the spiritual factor if not the only cause is certainly one of the 
must important causes of state survival and strength. 
 
 He believes that religion provides the telos which transcends culturally specific 
and historically determined political ideals of Asabiya. Religion not only reconciles the 
natural dichotomy between rural and urban life but it also reinforces the natural strength 
of Asabiya because the “call to religion increases the force of the Asabiya” (Rosenthal 
1988 p 97). 
 
 The Imam argues that ethnic particularity is not directly in conflict with Islam. It 
is complementary to it. He claims that, the religious call (dawa) is not complete (and 
effective) without Asabiya and there is no contradiction involved in ethnic particularity 
and religious universality, “he quotes in his support the Hadith, “Allah did not send a 
prophet without the protection of his tribe” (Rosenthal 1988 p 97). 
 
 The role of religion is teleological. Religion plays a role in the determination of 
the meaning of ethnic collectivity and the spiritual justification of this particularity. The 
Asabiya is not only the natural agent of political domination, but its equation with 
religious conviction, “determines the nature and purpose of the Khalafa which Ibn 
Khaldun so, deeply recognized” (Rosenthal 1988 p 97). The religious dimension not only 
provides the teleological basis of a collectivity but it also provides the spiritual basis of 
political hegemony because in the institution of the Khilafat, “the spiritual and temporal 
powers are united in the Imam” (Rosenthal 1988 p 97). 
 
 It is important to note that the complementary role of Asabiya in Imam Ibn-e-
Khaldun’s framework reveals that “Khuruj” is possible only with the support of Asabiya, 
“only a strong attack, backed by the Asabiya of tribes and clans, can remove rulers and 
destroy the edifice of these states which are firmly established” (Rosenthal 1988 p 96). If 
such Asabiya does not exist Khuruj is not regarded as obligatory on Muslims by Imam 
Ibn-e-Khaldun. 
 
 
 The strength of Asabiya not only helps to establish political domination but can 
also be used as a catalyst in the realization of religiously determined telos even against 
the will of the mulk. Being a realistic thinker the Imam acknowledges “that a “mulk” (i.e. 
Kings) is capable of looking after the welfare of man in this world, (but) even this is 
achieved more perfectly with the aid of (the) law of the Sharia since the prophetic 
lawgiver knows best what is to man’s advantage both in mundane and religious matters” 
(Rosenthal 1988 p 76). 
 
 The Imam acknowledges that tribal  and ethnic particularity provides a natural 
basis for establishing political order but stresses that it is the revelation and Sunnah which 
provides the epistemological basis for domination. In this sense Sharia provides a 
mechanism which not only justices the teleological dimension of political domination but 
also represents a basis for evaluating the conceptions of the good which emerge from the 
tribal ethnic particularities of Asabiya. The source of Sharia is Quran and Sunnah which 
is essentially a-historical and  transcends cultural and ethnic particularities. It provides an 
epistemological ground to circumscribe Asabiya. For instance “know that the whole 
world… is for the Law-giver but a way to the hereafter, for he who has no animal to ride 
on does not reach his goal. His {the law-giver’s} intention is not to forbid or blame man’s 
deeds … or to destroy the forces altogether which produce them, but rather to change 
their direction towards the aims of truth as far as possible, so that all intensions become 
right and the direction of man’s desires and plans a single one namely, to Allah and the 
hereafter” (Rosenthal 1988 p 99). 
 
 This means that the epistemological significance of the Sharia has not only been 
recognized by Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun, he also acknowledges that Sharia and its 
epistemological power provides a criterion to judge the direction of the socio-political 
process and its natural growth and consequences. According to Rosenthal, “there can be 
no doubt that Ibn Khaldun gives religion (that is, in practice, the Sharia of Islam) if not 
the first at least a very important place in the existing state” (Rosenthal 1988 p 99). On 
the basis of the above analysis we may argue that in the Imam’s methodological 
framework, the epistemological priority of the Quran and the Sunnah set the ideal 
standard not only for the political process and the legitimacy of state structure but for the 
historical process as a whole. However due to the realist and empirical orientation of his 
analysis “his inquiry into Islamic history and his experience of the temporary Muslim 
states in the Maghrib taught him that there is always a gap between the ideal demands of 
Sharia and political reality” (Rosenthal 1988 p 99). But although the Imam acknowledges 
that the socio-political realities in the context of changing historical conditions do not 
confirm to the Sharia determined ideals and norms the epistemological priority of 
“Sharia, its theoretical validity and overruling authority have never been 
(epistemologically) questioned” (Rosenthal 1988 p 99). The Quran and Sunnah provide a 
universal rationality despite the fact that they have been revealed and practiced in a 
particular history. The Sharia is thus essentially a-historical. It provides a meta-historical 
criterion to judge, assess and normatively evaluate existing socio-political institutions 
which are the product of specific historical processes. Rosenthal acknowledges that the 
epistemological priority of the Quran and the Sunnah in classical Muslim “jurists, like 
Al-Mawardi, Ibn Jama’a and Ibn-Taymiya, strove to maintain the purity of the law and 
showed what government ought to be in accordance with its provisions” (Rosenthal 1988 
p 100). Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s work validates and develops this classical tradition. 
 
 Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s distinction between Siyasa diniya (government based on 
God’s revealed law), and Siyasa aqliya (government based on political laws made by 
rational man) is also important in understanding the epistemological priority of the Quran 
and the Sunnah over human rationality in his system. Rosenthal acknowledges that, “Ibn 
Khaldun leaves no doubt that the law of the prophetic lawgiver is best and is superior to 
that of the human lawgiver, who is guided only by his reason” (Rosenthal 1988 p 100). 
 
 The epistemological priority of Siyasa diniya is that “this world alone is not 
man’s goal, for it is altogether useless and vain, since its end is death and destruction. 
God says; “Do you think that we created you for sport?” (Sura XXIII, 117). What is 
intended of man is his religion, which lets him attain happiness in the hereafter as the 
way of God…. “The laws came which placed an obligation upon him in all his affairs, 
like service of God, trade and commerce, including rule (mulk) which is natural for 
human association, so that they (the laws) lead the rule towards the ways of God and 
everything is within the reach and range of the Sharia” (Rosenthal 1988 p 101). 
 
III   CONCLUSION 
 
 Post modernism denies the possibility of meta-history because of the inherent 
incapacity Enlightenment discourse about rationality to provide absolute, objective, 
universal and a-historical criterion. In the Post modern discourse there are no 
epistemological grounds for the evaluation of history. 
 
 We are thus left with a stark choice. We can either accept the anti-foundationalist, 
non-essentialist post-modern ungroundedness of human being, who’s rational capacity is 
historically specific and culturally determined. The epistemological corollary of this 
conception of reason (which lacks ultimate objectivity is to accept the world as it is. Post 
modernism cannot provide a basis for confronting oppression and injustice for Post 
modernism offers no arguments, no critical resources or validating grounds for perceiving 
anything as inherently unjust and oppressive. 
 
 On the other hand we can revert to the anti modern epistemological domain of 
revelational authority. Khaldunian analysis reveals that cultural specific historically 
determined socio-political realities and institutions, their worth, strength and 
functionality, can objectively be assessed on the basis of the epistemology underlying the 
Sharia. This epistemology is a-historical and has the potential to act as a meta-historical 
criterion till the end of time. It is generally transcendental. Wittgenstein acknowledges 
that, “ the sense of the world must lie out side the world. In the world, everything is as it 
is and happens as it does happen, in it there is no value and if there were it would be of no 
value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie out side all happening and being so. 
For all happening and being so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in 
the world, for otherwise it would be accidental. It must lie outside the world 
(Wittgenstein 1961 p 41). 
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